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Sub-Saharan Africa is the most electricity-poor region in the world with an estimated 62.5 
percent or just above 600 million people without access to electricity and those who have 
access, are connected to an unreliable system that does not meet their energy needs. The 
introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) is perceived to be the panacea to all the 
sector’s problems in that it will attract much-needed private investment, increase generation 
capacity, reduce electricity tariffs due to efficiency and competition and ultimately increase the 
rate of access to electricity by the general population for the region. This study examined the 
impact of IPPs on electricity generation growth, tariffs and access in 48 countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa using panel data  from 1990 to 2013. The findings suggest that over the 23-year 
period, only 40 percent of the sampled countries had used IPPs for power generation. In 
addition, results from the panel regression estimations confirmed that the use of IPPs has 
increased regarding electricity generation growth and electricity access in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and also led to a reduction in electricity tariff. The policy implication of this study is that Sub-
Saharan African countries should allow for the participation of IPPs to achieve increased 
generation capacity, reduction of tariffs and increased access to electricity by the general 
population. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background of study  
Electricity is a very important ingredient of developing and improving the quality of human 
life, specifically in developing countries. Saila et al. (2016) and the World Bank (2017) in the 
“State of Electricity Access Report” argued that electricity access is intrinsically linked to 
“Sustainable Developmental Goals”, in particular those that improve the quality of life such as 
health, education, food security, gender equality, poverty reduction, and climate change. 
 
Electricity is a prerequisite for a properly functioning and efficient economy, globally. The 
industrial, commercial and domestic use of electricity has become so intertwined with human 
existence and development that any interruption causes major economic loss and  
inconvenience to all spheres of life; non-availability also stalls human development. 
 
Despite the global consensus of the importance of universal electricity access (Lucas2017) as 
evidenced by the adoption of Agenda 2063 and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development in which global leaders committed to achieving universal access to electricity by 
2030, there are still over “one billion” people with no access to electricity in the world. Just 
over six hundred (600) million of these people are in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a region remains a dark region. Avila et al. (2017) referred to Sub-
Saharan Africa as “the most electricity-poor region in the world” with an estimated 62.5 percent 
of its population without access to electricity and those that have access, are connected to an 
unreliable system that does not meet their energy needs. 
 
Consistent with the World Bank (2017) observation that “countries with the highest levels of 
poverty tend to have lower access to modern energy services”, there seems to be a positive 
correlation between well-being and access to modern energy services. In the same report, SSA 






With the realisation that access to electricity is a “developmental imperative” and sine qua non 
to achieving sustainable development, the United Nations (UN) included the need for 
“universal access to electricity” as Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7. Amongst others, 
one of the targets under SDG 7 is “to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern 




Figure 1.1: Access to electricity decreases as population grows in SSA 
 
Figure 1.1 above illustrates a historical analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
World Bank (2015) for the 14-year period between 2000 and 2014. When looking at access 
rate to electricity in relation to the population growth rate, they discovered that all developing 
regions, apart from SSA, indicated a trend of closing the “access deficit” gap, meaning the 
number of people without access was showing a downward trend. The only region with an 
upward trend of an increasing number without access to electricity as its population grew is 
SSA. 
 
Quite clearly, the electricity supply sector challenges of Sub-Saharan Africa must be studied 
extensively to be able to unlock potential solutions. This study explored the impact of private 
players in this sector, in the form of “Independent Power Producers” (IPPs),  their impact on 





The interest in extensively examining the impact of IPPs in SSA is due to the policy advocated, 
mainly by the World Bank (1993), in the early 1990s to reform the ESI by deregulation, 
liberalisation and encouraging private participation. These reforms were adopted by almost all 
developed countries and initially a few countries in SSA who embraced this policy. These 
sector reform policies are now almost adopted, whether in part or in whole, by most if not all 
Sub-Saharan African countries, just as the  other developing regions in the world. The reforms 
were seen to be a precursor to abundant, cheap electricity for all. 
 
This can be seen from recently published reports and Figure 1.1 above. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
still plagued by limited electricity generation growth, high tariffs and very low electricity 
access. It is therefore important to assess the impact of IPPs in the countries where they exist 
as opposed to the impact of the conventional state-owned utilities in the countries that depend 
on these for the development of the sector. 
 
The Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) for many years has been predominately sector owned 
and controlled by governments directly or through utility companies. The sector reforms in the 
past two decades, precipitated by the inability of governments to sustain these operations or 
finance further investments in new power plants to keep up with growing demand, have seen a 
shift in the policy direction to encourage private participation and investment in this sector. 
 
The introduction of independent power producers in this sector has been perceived and 
continues to be hailed as the panacea for all the sector’s deficiencies under state ownership and 
control. Harris (2006) described the resultant expectations of the sector reforms to be 
“abundant, cheap and reliable energy”. This research endeavoured to study whether the 
opening of the sector to IPPs does result in “abundant” and “cheap” electricity by measuring 
the impact of IPPs on “electricity generation growth” and tariff. With abundant and cheap 
electricity, the expectation would further be higher rates of access to electricity by the general 
population. 
 
In Africa, Cote d’Ivoire was the first country to open its market to private participation, 
followed by Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and most recently, 




be open for private participation and investment. Eberhard et al. (2016) reported that there are 
currently 126 IPPs in 18 countries of SSA out of 19 countries with an electricity sector structure 
that permits IPPs. Despite the opening-up of the sector to private participation, governments 
and utilities are still accounting for the highest proportion of investment and addition of 
electricity generation capacity. 
 
Notwithstanding all this investment by governments, utilities and IPPs, Africa remains with 
chronic shortages of electricity. This study evaluated, in a comparative form, the rate of 
generation growth, tariff and access rate growth of the countries that have IPPs and those that 
still rely on government/utilities to establish whether the policy decision of having IPPs is 
delivering the “abundant, cheap and reliable” electricity against the ESI markets that are 
dominated by state-owned utilities.  
 
Though Africa has a power sector funding requirement of $40.8 billion a year, equivalent to 
6.35 percent of its GDP as reported by Shkaratan et al. (2011), the actual expenditure is 80 
percent funded by domestic public funds and the remaining 20 percent split between Official 
Development Assistance and private investment which accounts for 16 percent and four 
percent, respectively. With the latest market developments in South Africa, these figures have 
improved slightly. The detail of this is analysed in the data. 
 
1.2  Problem statement 
The ESI market in SSA has two contending schools of thought that permeate in government 
policies and if not in policy, in practice, despite the officially adopted policy. The first school 
of thought, which for years justified the existence of a single-national electric utility operating 
as a public monopoly, as proposed by Saunders et al. (1993), is the view that “electricity is a 
strategic and publicly provided good and that people have a right to power at low prices”. 
This was once been a world-wide view and a foundation on which the ESI was built in all the 
“now developed” countries. Also, the capital-intensive nature of this sector and governments’ 
belief that low-priced electricity is critical in achieving economic and social development, 
perpetuated the public utility monopoly structure. However, due to declining technical 
performance, deteriorating financial positions and generally tough economic conditions, public 




and as such, a new school of thought emerged which advocated for the participation of private 
players in the ESI. 
 
The participation of the private players in the form of IPPs was perceived to be the panacea to 
all the sector’s problems. The evident demand of electricity in developing countries “conjured 
up images of multiple billions of dollars in investment” by the private sector in the form of 
project finance, as described by Churchill (1993), efficient operations and management of 
generating assets by the private sector better than public utilities can operate and manage. With 
the abundance of cheap electric power, greater access to electricity will  be achieved.  
 
The participation of private players gained impetus in the 1990s with most developed countries 
reforming, unbundling and privatising their sectors, while in developing countries, these 
reforms were a “condition precedent” to access World Bank financing as it has become the 
Bank’s policy to lend only to those countries that have implemented the reforms or are in the 
process of implementing them. 
 
In SSA, a country would seemingly have an ESI structure that shows dominance of one of the 
above  schools of thought. Some countries have opened up their sectors to be led by private 
players while others maintained the erstwhile structure of public utility monopoly. According 
to Eberhard et al. (2016), there are 19 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with fully integrated 
state-owned utilities with no private sector participation and 19 countries where IPPs can 
participate. The other  eight countries, though they do have IPPs, their state-owned utilities are 
not fully integrated. The table below indicates the countries with fully integrated state-owned 
utilities, those that operate a hybrid structure where IPPs operate along state-owned utilities 






Table 1.1: SSA country categorisation according to ESI structure 
 
Countries with “fully 
integrated state-owned 
utilities” 
Countries with IPPs Countries with no IPPs 
but also not “fully 
integrated” 
Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, CAR, Chad, 
Congo, DRC, Djibouti,  
Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Somalia 
Angola, Cape Verde, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, The 
Gambia, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe  
Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Namibia,   Seychelles  
 
The problem with these industry structures in place is that SSA remains electricity-poor despite 
these various structural permutations. We need to understand if there is a correlation between 
any of these structures and the electricity growth rate, tariff and access rate. The reformation 
of the ESI structure in some countries in SSA is to an extent the outcome of opening their 
market for the participation by IPPs. An understanding is required of how this has impacted on 
those countries’ electricity generation growth, tariff and general access by the population.  
Figure 1.2 below summarises the information presented by Eberhard et al. (2016) regarding  
the countries that have and those that do not have IPPs as part of their ESI. For the purposes of 
this study, irrespective of whether a country has a state-owned fully integrated monopoly utility 
or an unbundled structure for as long as that country does allow IPPs to coexist with that 
structure, those countries are classified as countries with IPPs.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Countries with and without IPPs 




The problem statement or research question can then be framed as follows:  
“Have countries that reformed their ESI and introduced IPPs managed to grow their electricity 
generation capacity, achieved lower electricity tariffs and increased electricity access rates 
compared to those countries whose ESI structure still remains predominately reliant on state-
owned monopoly utilities?”. 
 
This research question is informed by the factors used as motivation by proponents in favour 
of the reforms, the encouragement of IPP participation in the market and benefits associated 
with it. From this research question, the research assumption or hypothesis was then  
formulated as such and  informed the research objectives. 
 
The policy reforms of unbundling, privatisation and encouraging private participation and 
investment in the ESI are generally observed as a phenomenon that gained impetus in the 1990s 
with the likes of the United Kingdome (UK), Norway, the United States (US) and many other 
countries adopting this approach. Gartwick and Eberhard (2008) suggested that the primary 
reasons, amongst others, why these governments adopted the policy shift were insufficient 
public funds, poor plant performance and encouraging competition to ultimately achieve cheap 
electricity. However, developing countries were  coerced to adopt the same policies to gain 
access to funding from the World Bank and attract private investment into this sector to 
accelerate development. This study evaluated the exact impact of this policy on electricity 
generation, tariffs and access to electricity by the population of those countries in order to 
assess whether there are traces of the reform objectives being met. 
 
1.3  Purpose and justification of the research 
The purpose of this research was to test the two established schools of thought in the Sub-
Saharan African ESI as observed, which mainly inform government policy and ultimately the 
sector structure, for a comparative assessment of these two predominant structures to determine 
which one has had a positive impact on (1) electricity generation, (2) delivery of lower 





As chronicled by Khatib (2003) and many others, the ESI was initially founded by private 
initiatives and investors. Due to the technological and capital-intensive nature of this industry, 
it created a situation of local and national monopolies and international oligopolies, affording 
the private participant the exclusive right to charge exorbitant prices as there was no 
competition. One concern was the neglect of mainly rural areas as these were not as 
economically attractive as cities and urban areas. 
 
Later, governments, almost globally, with the exception of a few countries such as Germany, 
nationalised the entire ESI value chain, creating state-owned vertically integrated monopolies 
which could provide electricity even to rural areas and substantially limited the market abuse 
which was prevalent during the epoch of private ownership.  
 
This, however, later caused inefficacies because of state ownership which eventually led to the 
deregulation and unbundling in the early 1990s, again encouraging participation of private 
sector players, effectively bringing the industry back full circle to private ownership which 
may still present the problems earlier encountered with market abuse, focus on only 
economically attractive segments of society and depriving the less privileged access to 
electricity. 
 
This study, especially the juxtaposition of the IPPs’ impact on electricity generation, tariff and 
access against the performance of state-owned utilities, will help in giving context to the 
discourse of whether IPPs are the future of the industry especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Of note, is that most of the countries that successfully deregulated and unbundled their ESI 
were mainly well developed and industrialised with very high electricity access by their 
population. However, to achieve that state of development, their governments had to intervene 
and invest heavily in this sector to achieve the developmental agenda of growing their 
industries and access to electricity at very low tariffs.  
 
Therefore, the premature adoption of policies appropriate for matured markets to be 
implemented in “developing markets” may prove disastrous if not understood in the context of 
those countries and customised to the local challenges. While no extensive data analysis was 
conducted on the experiences of “other developing” regions such as South America and parts 





The justification of this research is that it considered all  Sub-Saharan African countries by 
analysing and evaluating the performance of countries with IPPs and their impact on electricity 
generation growth, tariff and access to electricity by the population. A similar analysis was 
carried out for the countries that rely on state-owned utility monopoly. Lastly, the results of the 
analysis were compared between the group of countries with different policies to evaluate 
which of the structures have the most positive impact on the three dimensions tested and further 
to test for correlation in the policy choices and the results thereof. 
 
1.4  Research objective(s) 
Based on the framing of the research problem statement as stated above, the following were 
the research objectives of this study: 
1. Evaluate and assess the impact of IPPs on electricity generation growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
2. Examine the effect of IPPs on electricity tariffs in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
3. Investigate the relationship between the introduction of IPPs and electricity access rate 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
1.5  Research hypotheses 
Premised from the associated benefits of deregulation, unbundling and mainly the participation 
of IPPs in the ESI of a country, the following null and alternative hypotheses were formulated 
for this research study: 
𝐻!: The use of IPPs has a significant positive effect on electricity tariff in Africa    
𝐻" : The use of IPPs has a significant negative effect on electricity tariff in Africa  
𝐻# : The use of IPPs has a significant positive effect on electricity access in Africa  
 
1.6  Organisation of the dissertation 
After this first chapter, Chapter 2, by means of the literature that was reviewed, lays the 
foundation for understanding the concept of IPPs, how they developed and the contextual 
factors that gave rise to this concept in the electricity supply industry. Chapter 2 also covers an 
in-depth  historical development of the ESI, how it was founded by private parties, the move 




privatisations in the early 1990s. The global experience of privatisation and IPPs is also well 
covered and more related to Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3 covers the research methodology, 
theoretical framework, model specification, empirical framework as well as the panel data 
model equation used as the basis formula from which the variant formulas to test the hypotheses 
were derived  and applied to the secondary data sourced for this study. This is followed by a 
brief discussion of the difference between fixed and random effects models and the motivation 
of the selected model for this study. This chapter also defines the measurements and variables 
used in the formula and data sources.  In Chapter 4, the research findings are presented and 
discussed expansively, including recommendations from the observations of the research. The 
conclusion sums up the general outcome of this study and suggests further areas of research 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter covers the definitions of terms of this study, and provides the overview of 
independent power producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical framework is discussed 
in detail, providing the theoretical foundation for this research.  The chapter concludes with the 
detailed empirical literature on independent power producers and their impact. 
 
2.2 Definition of terms  
The term ‘Independent Power Producer’ appears self-explanatory and implies producers of 
power that are independent. Despite various attempts by many authors, such as Joskow and 
Kahn (2002), there is no universally accepted scholarly definition of this term. Many others 
who write on this subject seldom attempt to define the term, creating  the impression that all 
and  sundry can understand what it means without any technical explanation. 
 
Other concepts, such as Non-Utility Generator (NUG) or Qualifying Facility (QF), are used 
interchangeably for Independent Power Producer. This further compounds the problem of 
properly defining this concept, as the definition will have to encompass these other concepts 
that are used interchangeably. 
 
Before defining terms, it is very important to trace their genesis and associated concepts. The 
concept of Independent Power Producers is first seen in the US Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978. In this Act, the concept of IPPs is not succinctly defined as 
such, but the terms Non-Utility Generator and Qualifying Facility are prominently used and 
defined in this Act. It is important to highlight that these definitions are in the context of the 
US ESI.  
 
In this context, Zucchet (1995) defined Independent Power Producers as “a wholesale 
electricity producer that is unaffiliated with franchised utilities in the area in which the IPP is 
selling power and that lacks significant marketing power. Unlike traditional utilities, IPPs do 
not possess transmission facilities that are essential to their customers and do not sell power 





He further defined a Non-Utility Generator as an “Electric generation by end-user, independent 
power producers, or small power producer under PURPA, to supply electric power for 
industrial, commercial, and military operations, or sells to electric utilities”.  
 
Eberhard et al. (2017) offered another definition of IPPs as “power projects that are mainly 
privately developed, constructed, operated, and owned; have a significant proportion of private 
finance; and have long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with a utility or another off-
taker”. 
 
In the US ESI structure, an Investor-Owned Utility could be deemed a utility in a state in which 
it has a franchise or a utility status, while also becoming an Independent Power Producer if it 
sets up operations in another state where it did not have a utility status. Therefore, the US 
definition of an IPP would have these elements of differentiating between location and utility 
status.  
 
Generally, in many other places  globally, because of the prevailing structure of a publicly-
owned integrated utility monopoly, an Independent Power Producer would mean an electricity 
generator that is not state- or utility-owned, but owned by private sponsors or investors.  
 
Although the whole concept of private sector participation as a reform principle of the World 
Bank (1993) is  fully unpacked in the next section, it is important to clarify at this stage that 
IPPs are but part of the whole proposition of private sector participation. The policy of the 
World Bank explains private sector participation in the ESI to include the sale of some or all 
assets, stock exchange listing, franchising, leasing, contracting out, and non-utility power 
generation. 
 
This suggests the participation of private entities in the entire value chain of the ESI and  singles 
out non-utility generation, also using the term found in the US PURPA, further giving evidence 
of the influence the US ESI reforms had on the World Bank’s policy formulation. 
 
The specialised nature of the ESI industry, especially the engineering design, construction and 
maintenance, nevertheless required that developing countries procure these services from 
foreign entities and import both the products and service to the developing countries. The 




utility generators was a new concept in a predominately state-utility monopoly structure of the 
developing countries. For the purposes of this study, reference to private participation is mainly 
focused on the participation in the ESI by Independent Power Producers. 
 
2.3  Overview of Independent Power Producers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Eberhard and Gartwick (2011) and Eberhard et al. (2016) provided contextual literature and 
detailed reports on the experience of IPPs in SSA. They found that in the early 1990s, almost 
all major electricity generation assets in SSA were financed through public finances and 
concessionary loans from Development Financial Institutions (DFIs). However, as public 
funds became insufficient to finance new electricity-generating assets, generally poor 
performance of the vertically integrated state-owned utilities, Sub-Saharan African countries 
were compelled to adopt a new model for the ESI, which included IPPs. 
 
The reforms adopted by some  Sub-Saharan African countries were coerced through the World 
Bank’s lending policy which made it difficult for these countries to access concessionary loans 
if they did not reform their ESI. The World Bank (1995) document, Lending for Electric Power 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, explicitly stated that the Bank “should avoid making large power loans 
unless the sector is operating reasonably well or substantially on its way to reform”, validating 
the institutionalisation of coerced reforms, as suggested by Henisz and Zelner (2005).  
 
The Sub-Saharan African countries as dependent actors were coerced to undertake institutional 
change by institutions such as the World Bank, that had the necessary power and legitimacy. 
The “political economy” of electricity market liberalisation as proposed by Erdogdu (2014)  
appeared in overwhelming strength to those actors who were proposing these reforms and the 
Sub-Saharan African countries had no other pragmatic alternative but to succumb to the new 
policies.  
 
This was evidenced by Eberhard and Gartwick (2011) who reported that multilateral and 
bilateral development institutions were withdrawing their funding from state-owned power 
projects. Urged by this, Sub-Saharan African governments adopted plans to unbundle and 
introduce IPPs as these were considered a solution to resolving the supply constraints, and they 




adopted, the prevalent structure is still dominated by vertically integrated state-owned utilities 
but allowing the entrance of IPPs. 
 
Eberhard et al. (2016) reported 126 IPPs in SSA, spread over 18 countries and accounting for 
approximately 25 percent of SSA’s installed capacity when excluding South Africa. The 
countries with  the most IPPs are Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. 
 
Table 2.1: IPPs per country 
COUNTRY NO. OF PROJECTS CAPACITY (MW) INVESTMENT VALUE (US$m) 
Angola 2 46 135 
Cabo Verde 1 26 80 
Cameroon 2 304 467 
Cote d'Ivoire 6 866 940 
The Gambia 1 25 36 
Ghana 5 1,006 1,680 
Kenya 16 1,066 2,334 
Madagascar 1 15 18 
Mauritius 6 272 520 
Nigeria 5 1,971 2,597 
Rwanda 1 100 200 
Senegal  5 351 615 
Sierra Leone 1 15 30 
Tanzania 4 427 598 
Togo 1 100 196 
Uganda 22 539 1,659 
Zambia 1 170 302 
South Africa 67 4,308 14,924 
Total 147 11,606 27,331 
 
Lucas et al. (2017) estimated that to close the electricity access gap in SSA by 2030, an amount 
between USD300-350 billion or USD15 – 19 billion per year, is needed, while Eberhard et al. 
(2017) estimated USD40.8 billion will be needed to invest in production capacity, transmission 
and distribution infrastructure. This kind of funding cannot be raised on the strength of the 
governments’ balance sheets or their utilities and hence the need to attract private investment.  
 
IPPs have added 11 GW of installed generation capacity and have invested a total of USD25.6 




relatively small compared to the additions by state-owned utilities. The idea that due to poor 
financial and technical performance of state-owned utilities, the introduction of IPPs would 
introduce competition has not been maximised in SSA at this stage .  
 
Eberhard et al. (2017) reported that 21 countries out of 48 in SSA still maintain the fully 
integrated state-owned utility structure, while the other 18 countries who have allowed IPP 
participation have only allowed the IPPs to operate parallel to their state-owned utilities. 
Perhaps this is a model that is unique to the Sub-Saharan context, that is to continue attracting 
private investment while making the state-owned utilities push the ESI issues with socio-
economic imperatives into consideration, thus creating a hybrid market structure of the 
coexistence of both public and private players moving in sync towards dealing with the unique 
challenges prevalent in SSA. 
 
Cote d’Ivoire was the first country to open its ESI, followed by Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. The key determinants, according to Eberhard et al. (2017), for 
creating a conducive environment that can easily attract IPPs, are planning expansion of 
generation using the least-cost option, streamlining procurement and contracting processes, and 
ensuring the financial health of off-taker utilities. The proposition of having off-taker utilities 
having good financial health, leads to  a circular argument. The state utilities are the main off-
takers, and to anchor the IPP project they need to provide a credible Power Purchase 
Agreement, failing which, financial closure of the project under “project finance” will not be 
achieved. If the state-owned utilities have the  ability to access funding on the strength of their 
balance sheet, then they can access funding at much cheaper borrowing costs than IPPs and 
can also save on the rate of return requirements which  are likely to be higher for IPPs than  for 
the utilities.  
 
The fundamental question would be why would IPPs be needed if the financial health of the 
utilities suggests they could  be able to pull through the projects the IPPs are developing. The 
reality, however, as reported by Eberhard et al. (2017), is that of the countries able to attract 
IPPs, none had a good credit rating, except for South Africa and Mauritius. This means these 
countries were able to attract investments which they would not normally be able to attract, 






Many writers give a positive account of the impact of IPPs in the Sub-Saharan African ESI. 
Traore (2013) shared the Ivorian experience that IPPs enable the country to add generation 
capacity expeditiously since the decision to fully privatise in 1994. He further reported that 
through the IPPs, the Ivory Coast became a net exporter to Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali 
and Togo, and that the Ivory Coast national electricity access rate improved significantly to 34 
percent with a much higher access rate in urban areas, estimated at 74 percent. IPPs added 866 
MW to the Ivorian system, representing a 74 percent growth in the installed generation capacity 
between 1990 and 2013 and IPPs accounting for 44 percent of the installed capacity. Providing 
‘comfort letters’ and guarantees to reduce financial, operational and commercial risks for the 
IPPs to access financing for the proposed projects, adds to the challenges seen as a tedious part 
of dealing with IPPs. 
  
Based on the  literature review, the concept of take-or-pay has become contentious in the Sub-
Saharan Africa market, where the PPA stipulates the amount of power that will be supplied to 
the utility or whoever is the off-taker. The off-taker must then pay a fixed capacity charge for 
the agreed volumes of power whether or not this volume has  actually been used. This practice 
is standard to guarantee that the cash-flows of the project are sufficient to service its financial 
obligations. The off-takers often feel that they are made to pay for what they have not used, 
and this constitutes a waste of financial resources which could be applied elsewhere if the 
generating assets were owned by a state-owned utility. This discourse has also been observed 
in Uganda  after its unbundling and privatisation. 
 
In Kenya, IPPs account for about 26 percent of the installed capacity. Eberhard et al. (2016) 
reported that IPPs have reported a higher “availability factor” when compared with generating 
plants operated by the state-owned utility. However, in the Kenyan experience, the state-owned 
utility tariff output was lower than IPPs. It is important to highlight that despite Kenya having 
opened its ESI for IPPs, this did not result in the achievement of Kenya’s expectations for 
electricity capacity growth.  
 
In 2003, the government of Kenya expressed disappointment with the performance of the sector 
and had to incorporate in its strategy the state-owned utility playing a bigger role in developing 





Similarly, in a  Gazette Vol. CVII (September 2014), the Ugandan government expressed its 
concern that the tariff outputs from privately-owned generation plants were much higher, 
resulting in  high ultimate costs for consumers. The Ugandan government has argued that the 
high electricity tariffs are negatively affecting the country’s ability to achieve its socio-
economic objectives. In that regard, the two big power projects under construction, Karuma 
(600MW) and Isimba (180MW), will be owned and operated by the state-owned generation 
utility, a reversal  of the government-adopted position of allowing generation to be operated by 
private players. 
 
2.4 Theoretical framework of Independent Power Producers 
The concept and phenomenon of Independent Power Producers, in its current form and 
definition, is a relatively new concept that can be traced to the early 1990s as a result of the 
electricity supply industry policy reforms that swept across the world, as a result of factors that 
are discussed in detail hereunder. 
 
Cooper (1948) and Melling (1998) proposed that the ESI was started and remained in the hands 
of private owners in the late 1800s, when the industry became formal and commercially viable 
after the breakthrough of Edison’s demonstration of electrical application. Bradley (2011) 
supported this position by asserting that the formal rise of the ESI took shape through the 
private investors such as JP Morgan in supporting Edison in establishing General Electric. This 
private ownership can be argued to be the original form of independent power production. 
However, at that time it was not termed as such as there had never been any alternative to 
independent power production, therefore the concept of IPPs would not suffice to define the 
ESI structure . 
 
Strange (1979) and Bowers (1982) presented the view that the private ownership of the ESI 
resulted in the access to electricity being a novelty for a privileged few in densely populated 
cities to the exclusion of rural areas. The private ownership of the ESI further resulted in 
standardisation challenges and anomalies in technology management and employment 
contracts.  
The ESI remained in the hands of private investors and pioneers for a very long  time. However, 
according to McDonald (1962), Insull in the US advocated for state-wide public utility 




generation assets that reduced the per unit costs, thus facilitating  increased access at a cheaper 
price. According to Bradley (2011), this was achieved with the promulgation of the Federal 
Power Act and Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 in the US, effectively creating 
utilities which were regulated, controlled and supported by government. In the UK, the 
watershed moment came in 1947 when the ESI was nationalised by the Labour Government. 
By the mid-50s, the ESI, almost globally, was in the hands of publicly-owned monopoly 
utilities. 
 
According to Vanderlinden (1988), the US experienced challenges in 1973 as a result of 
dependence on foreign-produced oil for power generation when OPEC imposed oil embargoes. 
This resulted in the Public Utility Regulation Policies Act of 1978, which encouraged local 
independent power producers to reduce reliance on oil for power generation. The modern-day 
concept of Independent Power Producers started to take form at this time. Due  to the success 
of the US experience of introducing private producers in the ESI, many more countries 
followed in opening up the ESI for private participation. In 1993, the World Bank made known 
its official position to encourage developing countries to move away from state-owned utilities 
to unbundling and privatisation. 
 
The main arguments that form the basis of this research study are explained by Mizrahi and 
Tevet (2014) that developed countries’ need for reforming their ESI was aimed at “improving 
the performance of a relatively efficient system”, whereas, according to Jamasb (2006) and 
Newbery (2002), developing countries needed to reform their ESI to solve problems of price 
subsidies, poor service quality, inadequate rates of fee collection, frequent network outages and 
service coverage that governments were no longer willing or able to support under the state-
owned monopoly arrangement.  
 
As the developing countries adopted the reforms in their ESI to solve the issues as highlighted 
above, the resultant expectation as proposed by Saunders et al. (1993) was that developing 
countries will be able to attract private investment that will (1) increase electricity generation, 
(2) drive-down tariffs, and (3) increase access to electricity by the general population. The 
opening up of the sector for private producers would bring competition amongst the players 
who will strive to produce more cheaply, leading to the increase of generation capacity and 




connecting customers not having access, thus also increasing the access rate in a country or 
market. 
 
This study tested whether the IPPs have had this impact, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by 
testing the impact of IPPs on those countries that implemented the reforms with regards to (1) 
electricity generation growth, (2) tariff, and (3) access to electricity by population. This impact 
was compared to those countries that have not implemented any reforms and remain driven by 
state-owned monopoly utilities.  
 
The reason for comparing countries with IPPs and those without IPPs, measuring the three 
variables, is because of the argument also observed by Saunders et al. (1993), that the 
proponents who were against the reformation of the ESI in favour of single national utility 
monopoly model, argued that “electricity is a strategic and public-provided good that people 
should have a right to at low prices”.  Therefore, the juxtaposition of the two policy models is 
important in order to determine which has had a much more positive impact in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
This study used a panel data model to test the correlation between the policy choice of either 
having IPPs in the ESI or not and the impact it has on the three variables. The policy choice 
was the ‘dependent variable’ in the study and the other three variables were the independent 
variables. 
 
2.5  Empirical literature on Independent Power Producers and their impact 
Borenstein et al. (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), Puller (2004) and Ishii (2006) all traced the 
concept and introduction of Independent Power Producers to the passing of the US Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. Vanderlinden (1988) chronicled the events that led to 
the US implementing this policy, which effectively introduced IPPs, emanating from the 1973 
OPEC oil embargo which raised concerns in America that the country was heavily dependent 
on foreign nations for its energy. The dependence on oil for power generation was the primary 
problem the US desired to solve by introducing IPPs under the PURPA. 
 
Despite the fact the US ESI had other challenges at the time, such as environmental concerns 




and disruptions caused by new transmission lines, the main focus as reported by Goodwin 
(1978) was not to solve all these industry woes, but to reduce oil imports. White (1996) 
suggested that after the passing of the PURPA, most of the American states adopted the reforms 
introducing IPPs because of “high electricity prices suffered” by consumers in those states, 
especially when compared to neighbouring states. According to Ishii (2006), the IPPs were 
mainly subsidiaries of the existing investor-owned utilities that were already operating in other 
states, enjoying a utility status.  
 
The introduction of IPPs in the US ESI started a global phenomenon that was later followed 
by other developed and developing countries all for different reasons. The US sought to 
implement IPPs to reduce oil dependence but other developed countries, according to Mizrahi 
and Tevet (2014), aimed “to improve the performance of a relatively efficient system”. 
 
To properly understand the significance of the arguments between state-ownership versus 
private participation in the ESI, it is important to revisit how this sector developed under private 
ownership, how it was later nationalised and the contextual considerations for the 
nationalisation and its ultimate unbundling and privatisation again in the 1990s. 
 
Strange (1979) traced the start of what would eventually become the electricity supply industry 
to the earliest application of electricity to lighting in Paris during the period 1875 to 1878. This 
sparked great public interest in the technology of electric lighting and enquiries were made by 
municipal authorities of this technology, specifically for the application in street lighting as 
reported by The Electrician (1878). 
 
The breakthrough development and defining moment for the ESI, as reported by Hammond 
(1944), was on 21 October 1879 when  Edison demonstrated an electric lamp using a 
carbonised thread as filament and managed to keep it burning steadily for two days. This led 
to the first commercial installation of Edison’s lamps in steamship Columbia in May 1880 
consisting of 115 electric lights that were successfully operated for 15 years.  
 
Although static electricity had been a known phenomenon from as early as 600BC, according 
to Peregrinus (1986), it is argued that  Edison’s invention and success of the incandescent lamp 




The first commercial power station was commissioned in New York City in September 1882  
as the Pearl Street Power Station 
 
Bradley (2011) proposed that the formal rise of the ESI took shape when private investors such 
as J. P. Morgan supported Edison in the launch of the business that would later become General 
Electric. As also observed by Cooper (1948) and Melling (1998), the ESI was developed and 
controlled by private owners.  
 
Cooper (1948) argued that measures were taken to improve efficiencies and reliability of the 
ESI, but generation and distribution were mainly in the hands of hundreds of independent 
undertakings and companies and these presented major challenges for the industry. Despite the 
ESI being mainly a business of private owners, the development and growth of the sector seem 
to have taken the same trajectory as initially observed in the UK and US. 
 
In the UK, as reported by Cooper (1948), the ESI was in the hands of hundreds of independent 
undertakings and companies. Melling (1998) suggested that as early as 1882, with the passing 
of the Electricity Act, 1882, the government intended that the industry should be under public 
ownership and control to avoid abuses that had already been experienced in the gas and water 
companies. However, this proposition was met with resistance and strong opposition from both 
the private owners and local-authority interest. Two major commissions, namely Williamson 
Committee in 1917 and Birchenough Committee in 1919, had similar recommendations of 
putting the ESI under public ownership. The latter committee resulted in the passing of the 
Electricity (Supply) Act of 1919 which established the Electricity Commission, leaving 
generation and distribution in the hands of the private owners and thus allowing the formation 
of Joint Boards with limited planning powers. 
 
Two more committees were set up in the UK, the Weir Committee of 1925 and the McGowan 
Committee in the early 1930s. The Weir Committee resulted in the formation of the Central 
Electricity Boards who were mandated to own and operate transmission systems, but still 
leaving the generation and distribution to private players.  
 
It could be argued that the UK ESI at this juncture had reached a stage of what contemporary 
advocates of open market could call “an optimal ESI structure”. Private players were in charge 




however, did not present a perfect structure under which the ESI could be sustainable and 
flourish. As reported by Strange (1979) and Bowers (1982), access to electricity remained a 
novelty for a few elite located in densely populated areas, while this structure presented major 
technical challenges as there were anomalies in the standards of service, tariffs and conditions 
of employment as recorded by Cooper (1948). 
 
Harris (2006) propounded that the development of the ESI in every country has largely been 
shaped by the political model and paradigm of that country. Erdogdu (2014) further supported 
this observation by suggesting that developments or reform experiences in countries can be 
explained by the differences in the relative strength of interest groups. As early as 1882, the 
UK government had intended to put the ESI under public ownership and control; however, the 
interest groups that were against such a proposition were powerful and enjoyed much political 
support which led to failure  of any attempts to reorganise the industry. 
 
In a  watershed moment for the UK ESI  in 1947, with a Labour Government in power, the 
1947 Electricity Act was passed which effectively nationalised the UK ESI to remedy the 
defects and anomalies as they existed then under the predominant private ownership structure. 
At the time of privatisation of the ESI in the UK, there were already 625 electricity companies 
which had to be merged and incorporated within 12 area electricity boards. 
 
Similarly, according to Bradley (2011), the US ESI development followed the same trajectory 
as the UK, where private players were the champions of the industry. The slight variation in 
the US ESI was the early consolidation of small generators in preference of bigger efficient 
generating units which provided “economies of scale” mainly led by an early prominent ESI 
mogul, Samuel Insull. This consolidation led to the creation of what can be called a “modern 
power grid” which could serve more customers more cheaply as observed that as a result of the 
large efficient generating units and advanced high-voltage transmission, electricity tariffs fell 
year after year between 1902 and 1930. The  early experience could be used to argue that when 
privately-owned entities are given the space to innovate and self-regulate, they may come with 
the best solutions for society. However, as far as the ESI global experience is concerned, this 
was an exception rather than  the norm. 
 
Geddes (1992) recounted the role of politics in the early development of the US ESI, by 




lighting contracts and trying to defend itself from other political proponents who sought to 
impose takeovers of the generators by local authorities or cap their tariffs. According to 
McDonald (1962), the likes of Insull advocated for state-wide public utility regulation as the 
best way to provide low-cost electricity and potential takeovers. Around 1914, state-level 
commissions were formed to play an oversight role of electric utilities. At this point it is 
important to draw attention to some similarities of the discourses being had in the contemporary 
ESI in relation to developing region. UK ESI developed through a number of private generators 
and distributors driving the industry development. This resulted in a disjointed and 
uncoordinated development that became expensive to operate, manage and service and had a 
high tariff output. In the US, the process of consolidating small generators in favour of large 
efficient generators delivered sustained lower tariffs and much greater access. 
 
Bradley (2011) reported that the great depression had very dire implications for the ESI, and 
the Federal Power Act and Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 were promulgated 
changing the structure of the US ESI. This established the public utilities and bolstered more 
intervention and control by the Federal government. Private ownership was effectively 
replaced by public utilities that were owned at local level but federally regulated. 
 
Other countries whose ESI was still predominately in the hands of private ownership followed 
in the path of nationalisation as done in Canada (1944), France (1946) and Argentina (1958), 
to name a few, seeking consolidation, economies of scale and better planning. The 
developmental trajectory of other countries was also mainly informed by the dominant political 
paradigm in that country; however, for a very long period the global structure of the ESI 
remained being that of a fully vertically integrated public utility responsible for generation, 
transmission and distribution.  
 
In Germany, the development of the industry was quite different to both the experiences in the 
UK and US, in that the German ESI grew from shareholder-owned manufactures who held 
contracts with cities for supply of light and power. The prices were set by regulation and 
compulsory purchases protected by the state. There were attempts to nationalise the ESI in 
1919 but this was not carried through. 
 
Much was achieved under the predominant ESI structure both in developed and developing 




as public monopoly has facilitated the expansion of power supplies, captured technical 
economies of scale and made effective use of scarce managerial and technical skills”. This 
monopolistic structure also had challenges of its own.  
 
According to the World Bank (1993), the challenges that were observed in the developing 
countries under the state-owned utility monopoly were (1) decline in real power tariffs, (2) 
quality of service deterioration, (3) technical and non-technical losses and fuel consumption, 
(4) poor maintenance of plants, and (5) poor commercial performance as a result of inadequate 
metering, billing, and collection inefficiencies. Furthermore, the state-owned utilities were 
observed to have a low rate of return on revalued assets and low self-financing ratio. 
 
Jamasb (2006) and Newbery (2002) succinctly argued that the need for reforms in the ESI 
during the early 1990s can be explained and understood in the context of “developing” and 
“developed countries”. Jamasb (2006) proposed that developing countries’ need to reform the 
ESI was intended to solve problems of price subsidies, poor service quality, inadequate rates 
of fee collection, frequent network outages and poor service coverage that governments were 
no longer willing or able to support under the existing arrangement.  
 
In contrast to the reasons advanced for developing countries, Mizrahi and Tevet (2014) 
suggested that the reforms in “developed countries” were mainly aimed “to improve the 
performance of a relatively efficient system”. A systematic approach was then adopted for the 
reform of the sector, applying a singular framework to solve different problems.  
 
Developing countries had little option available to them but to implement or commit to 
implement the proposed sector reforms, as the World Bank (1993) made it policy to  support 
countries that  embraced the principles of reforms.  The observations by Henisz and Zelner 
(2005) in regard to “coerced reforms” were that some actors that coerce dependent actors to 
undertake institutional change are often assumed to succeed on account of both power and 
legitimacy. In adopting the “1993 Lending Policy to Developing Countries Electric Power 
Sector”, which left “developing countries” with very little option but to reform if they still 
intended accessing borrowing facilities of the World Bank demonstrated  coercive power  using 
its power and legitimacy. 
According to the Electricity Deregulation Report (2006), the deregulation and privatisation 




factors. In Europe, ten of the EU countries swiftly moved to open up their retail markets ahead 
of schedules from the EU directive while others moved very slowly. Smaller countries in the 
EU requested to be exempted from the process of deregulation and privatisation based on 
evidence that these reforms were not effective in smaller markets, because there is not enough 
volume to justify large enough number of participants at the various levels. It is important to 
highlight that although there was a clear indication that the reforms may not be effective for 
smaller markets, the policy to coerce Sub-Saharan Africa through the World Bank Lending 
Policy for SSA, compelled countries in SSA to implement the reforms irrespective of their 
market size. 
 
The report explains that even in the UK, the unbundling resulted in higher overhead costs that 
even though the market was bigger, for any retail private company to be profitable it should 
have at least a million customers. This meant that with the number of customers, there would 
still be very few players and the benefits of economies of scale would not be realized, resulting 
in the costs associated with decentralisation increasing the sector overheads and directly 
pushing up the electricity tariffs. 
 
 As reported by Eberhard et al. (2016), countries in SSA had very  small market sizes, even in 
today’s terms. They reported that only 13 countries out of 48 have power systems larger than 
1 Gigawatt (GW), 27 countries with a power system smaller than 500 Megawatt (MW) and the 
remaining 14 countries’  systems smaller than 100MW. If the reforms were inadequate for the 
smaller European countries, logic would suggest that the same reforms would be inadequate 
for countries in SSA with smaller markets. 
 
In the Americas around 1992 there was deregulation that paved the way for independent 
generators to sell power directly to the local distribution and supply companies, rather than to 
the generators. As such, Standard Market Design was established. In Canada, most utilities are 
vertically integrated and owned by the provinces, with varying degrees of competition. South 
America was the early leader in electricity deregulation, as reported by Harris (2006).  Chile 
led the deregulation, followed by Argentina (1992), Peru (1993), Bolivia and Columbia (1993), 
Central American countries (1997), Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador in late 1990s. In 2002, the Inter-
American Development Bank reported private ownership in generation was 90 percent in 
Chile, 60 percent in Argentina, 60 percent in Peru, 40 percent in El Salvador, 30 percent in 





In Australasia, Australia’s industry is substantially unbundled and private, with state ownership 
being highly corporatized. New Zealand also had a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly, 
which was unbundled and deregulated in 1995, thus creating a wholesale market since 1996. 
 
In Asia, China is reported to be the fastest-growing ESI in the world, perhaps consistent with 
Khatib’s (2003) observation that electricity growth rate is correlated to the economic growth 
in a country. China has a State Power Corporation. According to the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), India is the sixth largest energy consumer in the world; however, as also 
reported in the State of Electricity Report (2017), India still has an estimated 270 million people 
without access to modern electricity supply. In India, the industry was liberalised in 1990 to 
encourage investment by independent power producers and to attract foreign investment. 
However, third party access to the grid and complex cross subsidies created commercial 
challenges which in turn resulted in very limited foreign investment. 
 
In Japan, the ESI was monopolised during the Second World War and converted into state-
owned vertically integrated monopolies. A process of reforming the industry in Japan began in 
1995 with little change in the ownership structure and in 2012 Japan nationalised its generation 
after the Fukushima accident. 
 
In the Middle East countries, though their governments are predominately conservative, there 
are reported intentions of privatisation and liberalisation of the ESI to be able to attract 
necessary investment, while the UAE have proceeded speedily in implementing privatisation. 
 
In Africa, Cote d’Ivoire was the first country to open up its market followed by Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda. As reported by Eberhard (2016), most of the 
countries in the African continent have implemented some form of reforms such as introducing 
regulators, corporatizing their utilities and even introducing independent producers.  
 
Thus far  this study looked at the historical development of the ESI in the global context. What 
can be deduced from this historical information, is that the ESI was established through private 
ownership and for various reasons, went through a process of nationalisation, creating 
vertically integrated utility monopolies. In the 1990s there was a process of deregulation and 





This historical overview of how the ESI developed and contextualising the contentious issues 
in its development is critical in laying a foundation for understanding the rest of this study. The 
emphasis is on the structure that dominated in the inception of the industry, the challenges 
related to them, subsequent developments and the iteration of these structures as influenced by 
many factors and the impact of those structures to the fundamentals of the industry. 
 
The successes of the voluntary ESI reforms in the US, and later also in the UK, played a major 
role in influencing the World Bank’s policy in the early 1990s towards developing countries. 
The World Bank (1993) suggested the successes in both the US and UK are examples of 
pioneering endeavours that challenged that notion that the electricity sector is a natural 
monopoly. As privatisation gained momentum in the developed countries, the developing 
countries were left with little option as the World Bank had made it an official policy to  lend 
to only those countries committed to implementing the reforms. As Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004) suggested, public reforms are not a radical, one-time change, but a gradual process that 
is incremental. In a memorandum circulated by the World Bank (1995) to its Executive 
Directors and President, the bank explicitly stated that the Bank should avoid making large 
power loans, mainly to Sub-Saharan African countries unless the sector is operating reasonably 
well or is substantially on its way to reform. 
 
The five guiding principles of the World Bank that signified a reformed ESI of a developing 
country were (i) Transparent Regulatory Process, (ii) Commercialisation and Corporatisation, 
(iii) Importing Services, (iv) Committed Lending and (v) Private investment. 
 
Summarising the first four principles, the Transparent Regulatory Process was explained as 
government needing to set objectives, articulate overall policies and coordinate sector 
development to enable the greatest possible degree of accountability and separation of 
responsibilities between the government and the entities responsible for power supply. This 
further required the establishment of an autonomous regulatory agency to enforce regulation 
and settle disputes.  
 
The need was for power enterprises to commercialise and corporatize so as to operate on 
commercial principles and be treated as commercial enterprises, paying interest and taxes, and 




and Committed Lending were advocated for the utilities in developing countries to continue 
importing services and products from foreign entities and fulfilling their borrowing 
commitments. 
 
The historical account of the ESI reforms, in particular the introduction of IPPs, is never 
complete without the recounting of the colossal failure experienced in California. The 
Californian experience resulted in the ESI global fraternity briefly suspending the reform 
programme and rethinking the implications of a privately-led ESI.  According to the Electricity 
Deregulation Report (2006), California was the first state to enact an electricity restructuring 
plan. Subsequent to these reforms, the electricity tariffs began to increase astronomically,  
causing the public to question the reforms introduced. By the 2000s the state was experiencing 
limited power supply and increased demand which drove the wholesale price of electricity to  
soar in California and pushing up the retail prices to as much as double the customary electricity 
bill. The problem further intensified in the winter of 2000 as the state’s utilities experienced a 
financial crisis and consumers experienced electricity shortages and high prices. This was 
certainly not the  experience envisaged by Harris (2006), who described the resultant 
expectation of the sector reforms to be abundant, cheap and reliable energy. The Californian 
crisis resulted in many governments around the globe suspending plans of reforming the sectors 
and even gave justification to those governments that were really not in favour of the reforms 
programme from the start, citing the reform failure in California. 
 
The experience in California was not the only negative experience of the impact of IPPs in the 
ESI. A study conducted by Albouy and Bousha (1998) evaluating the impact of IPPs on 
developing countries and even Asian countries plus Turkey, Morocco and Colombia, at a time 
that these countries represented 85 percent of the developing market, found the following: 
 
• The private sector had assumed some of the industry risk, such as construction risk and 
operational risk. 
• IPPs were highly leveraged and mainly sourced their funding from international 
markets,  which increased the exposure to foreign exchange risk. 
• In most of the countries, IPPs added new capacity that avoided supply interruptions or 




• IPPs were largely responsible for more price increases due to the high market-related 
costs of borrowing, unsubsidised capital costs and operations as opposed to state-owned 
utilities. 
 
Greacen and Greacen (2004) similarly chronicled the history of privatisation in Thailand and 
the impact of IPPs. The experience in Thailand included an increase in generation and tariff. 
The most important observation was the reaction of government in a time of financial crisis. 
According to Greacen and Greacen (2004), the Asian financial crisis of 1994 resulted in low 
demand for electricity and devaluation of Thailand’s currency, the Baht. This tested how 
Thailand would respond under such circumstances, whether measures to protect the consumer 
would be implemented or interventions to favour mainly the IPPs. As already reported by 
Albouy and Bousha (1998), IPPs are by nature highly levered as they are financed through 
“project finance” and cash-flows guaranteed through PPAs that are concluded on a “take-or-
pay” basis. Louw and Bhengu (2012) explained the “take-or-pay” concept as a contractual 
agreement where the producer agrees to sell to the power purchaser its output up to a certain 
annual amount or for all of its produced output. In turn, the power purchaser agrees to pay the 
agreed amount for the agreed volume regardless of whether it actually takes delivery or not. 
 
In circumstances such as the Asian financial crisis, there is a reduction in electricity demand 
and the currency is devalued; however, the financial and contractual commitments remain 
standing against the purchaser and the costs of such arrangements are often passed to or 
recovered from the consumer. Greacen and Greacen (2004) confirmed that all these factors 
prevailed in  the Thailand financial crisis, and the government response to this crisis sought to 
guarantee the returns of the IPP investors, thus giving priority to IPPs over benefits to the 
consumer.  
 
Vanderlinden’s (1988) analysis of the impact of IPPs or “non-utility generator” under PURPA 
suggests that these reforms resulted in the social costs of electricity production being 
completely replaced by the commercialisation without consideration of social imperatives. 
Bayliss and McKinley (2007) made a very strong argument of the failure of privatisation to 
deliver much needed electricity access to reach many Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
such as eradicating poverty, education and health goals. They further propounded that 
privatisation worsens poverty in that it focuses on financial sustainability rather than on social 




dimension of “climate change” which has also imposed certain limitation on the technology 
that developing countries can deploy in closing their electricity needs contradicts the central 
proposition by subordinating poverty eradication to climate policy objectives. 
 
The balance between commercial and social imperatives has always been a contentious matter 
in the ESI development, especially in developing countries. Saunders et al. (1993) observed 
that the proponents that continued to favour the single national utility monopoly model, largely 
held the view that “electricity is a strategic and publicly-provided good and that people have a 
right to power at low prices”. This, according to the World Bank (1993), resulted in the average 
real power tariffs in developing countries declining from around 5.2 cents to 3.8 cents/kWh. 
The World Bank further noted that many governments had also attempted to use the power 
sector and other publicly provided infrastructure services to address issues of social equity 
despite experience showing that such policies are costly and ineffective in dealing with the 
issues of social equity.  
 
These observations by the World Bank, instead of being long-held views, were an evolution of 
the Bank’s perspective as evidence of policy during the public utilities paradigm supported by 
the bank, electricity at all cost to the poor in the form of social equity was a paramount policy. 
 
In supporting public utility monopolies in the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank in its 
Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 3.72 articulated its broad policy objectives in accord 
with the public utilities paradigm prevailing at that time. The objectives of the World Bank 
were to (i) help to provide power services on the basis of least cost development programmes, 
(ii) strengthen the sector’s institutions and improve their efficiency, (iii) increase local resource 
mobilisation and catalyse co-financing, and (iv) improve access to electricity  disadvantaged 
groups. 
 
The fourth objective of improving access to electricity by disadvantaged groups was one of the 
objectives with social consideration and in today’s terms could be understood in the context of 
the importance of electricity access to achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
Social Development Goals (SDGs) as proposed by Bayliss and McKinley (2007), Ekoevi et al. 
(2017) and Lucas et al. (2017), that electricity access is linked to the achievement of the MDGs 





However, with the new World Bank policy in which it pushes for reforms in the ESI, the main 
emphasis is more on “Commercialisation and Corporatisation” of the utilities suggesting that 
they should charge tariffs that will give adequate rates of returns, make profits and pay taxes.  
 
In fact, Covarrubias et al. (1995) observed a notable shift of the World Bank in its new policy, 
that it no longer emphasised “access to basic electricity services by the poor” as it did in the 
Operational Manual Statement 3.72, but now focused on encouraging the sector to be 
commercially operated and to a very great extent led by Independent Power Producers and 
other private entities in the entire ESI value chain.  
 
The World Bank (1995) justified the policy shift from pursuing electricity access by the poor, 
particularly in SSA, by reporting that “improving access by the poor was arguably the most 
least feasible objective for SSA countries, given their financial and fiscal woes, their low per 
capita income and their stage of economic development and this situation will remain as such 
for the foreseeable future”. In doing so, the Bank had to reaffirm its new position of abandoning 
access to minimal electricity service as a welfare objective. 
 
The World Bank position is consistent with Munasinghe et al.’s (1988) general pricing 
principle for electricity in that the tariff charged to the consumer should be reflective of the 
true cost of providing electricity. The counterarguments advanced by Vanderlinden (1988) and 
Bayliss and McKinley (2007) were that through the introduction of IPPs the social cost of 
electricity has been replaced by commercialisation without consideration of social imperative 
and in particular the access by the poor to electricity to advance the achievement of MDGs. 
Such thinking has been the reason governments in developing countries have been providing 
electricity at below the true costs of providing it.  
 
Selling electricity at below its true costs, though it seems an easy way to give electricity access 
to many, has very negative externalities, as reported by the IMF (2013), in that providing 
subsidised energy causes economic harm and  distortions. Amongst the negative implications 
of subsidised or under-priced electricity tariff are the following: 
 
• Crowding out growth-enhancing or pro-poor public spending 
Funds that could be used for economic growth enhancement or in advancing other 




the public finances. Energy subsidies are not an optimal mechanism for distributing 
wealth compared to other public spending options. 
 
• Discouraging investment in the sector 
The subsidies artificially keep the prices of electricity low which results in lower profits 
or even losses. This inhibits state-owned utilities  from being able to increase generation 
capacity as they cannot borrow using their balance sheet and the sector remains 
unattractive to the private investors to come in. This may eventually result in  
underinvestment in expansions and culminate in a supply crisis. 
 
• Creating harmful market distortions 
Because of artificially low electricity tariffs, energy-intensive industries tend to invest 
more in high  energy-consuming technology at the expense of labour-intensive sectors 
that could create much-needed jobs. 
 
• Subsidised energy stimulates demand, encourages inefficient use and unnecessary 
pollution 
Subsidised electricity consumption from unclean sources of generation leads the 
consumer to be prone to wasteful consumption  and further contributing to  pollution. 
 
• Subsidised energy does not benefit the poor 
Subsidies disproportionately benefit industrial users and high-income households who 
consume more electricity than the poor groups and all these are subsidised with public 
finances that could be put to better social use. 
   
Most recently, Eberhard et al. (2018) who investigated how Tanzania’s ESI sector facilitated 
investment, using qualitative techniques and triangulating the results to ensure integrity of the 
findings, found, amongst other factors, deficiencies in the planning and a lack of competitive 
procurement of the IPP capacity which resulted in costly deals and resources spent on disputes. 
In Tanzania the desires impact of increased generation capacity, lower tariff and increased 
access was not achieved. A similar study by Eberhard et al. (2018), evaluating the impact of 
IPPs in Kenya, found that contrary to Tanzania’s experience that IPPs accounted for 43 percent 




average above 90 percent against a target of 85 percent, the tariff output of IPPs was higher 
than that of the state-owned utility company. This study did not consider the rate of access to 
electricity by the population as an integral part of the study. 
 
Montmasson-Clair and Ryan (2014), in their study of renewable IPPs in South Africa between 
the period 2008 to 2011, found that competitive bidding resulted in a tariff output below the 
capped tariff and every successive bidding window further reduced the tariff from the last 
bidding window. This suggest that, unlike in Kenya and Tanzania, if the principles of 
competition are fully applied in introducing IPPs in a market, it does result in the reduction of 
tariff. In the South African market, the IPPs were only limited to renewable technologies, and 
as such, although the generation capacity was increased it could not be comparable to the fossil 
fuel plant capacity of the state-owned utility. IPP capacity remains very marginal. This study 
also did not incorporate the access factor by the population. 
 
A quantitative study using the Multi-Period Stochastic Optimization Model was conducted by 
Afful-Dadzie et al. (2016) to study the long-term generation capacity planning for Ghana under 
budget constraint and developed a predictive Multi-Period Stochastic Integer Linear 
Programming Model (MILP) that can quantify the savings required to fund all future generation 
capacity. The assumption of this model is that savings are periodically made to finance new 
capacity and unused savings are used in subsequent periods. The findings suggested that Ghana 
required to save 0.75 percent per year to finance additional generation capacity between 2016 
and 2035. The limitation of this study is that it assumed all new capacity to be added by the 
state-owned utility, did not consider project finance where only marginal equity would be 
required and the rest of the project value financed through debt, but worked on the premise of 
total funding through the government’s balance sheet. Other variables of interest to this study 
were not part of this study, such as tariff and access. 
 
A much more comprehensive quantitative study was conducted by Dertinger et al. (2019) to 
evaluate the impact of reforming the electric power sector in developing economies, with an 
analysis of data of more than 30 years and 100 developing countries with a focus on efficiency 
and access to electricity. The finding by Dertinger et al. (2019) suggests that the full 
implementation of the reforms increased connections by a 20 percent point and per capita 
consumption by 62 percent. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the reforms reduced 




The dominant proposition from the literature review is that the introduction of IPPs does 
increase electricity generation in a country, but also increases tariffs to reflect the true costs of 
providing electricity. The policy chosen by a country of whether to introduce IPPs or maintain 
a state-owned monopoly utility is an outcome of many considerations. As much as the literature 
review covers electricity generation extensively, electricity access and correlation of these 
three factors is not explored in most of the studies. 
 
With regards to tariff levels, the literature suggests that  many governments view electricity as 
a public good that must be accessed by many at low costs. Despite these compelling arguments 
in favour of the social dimensions of electricity, the literature also warns about the setbacks in 
the ESI that may result from artificially low electricity tariffs. 
 
This suggests that policy makers must try to balance the interest of all in the ESI, namely those 
of the  consumer, investors, producers etc. This research evaluated whether this balance was 
achieved in measuring the growth in electricity generation, tariff level and access to electricity 
by the population. 
 
Since electricity has the potential of improving the standard and quality of life, especially of 
poor people, as evidenced by the SDG 7 being a catalyst to enable the achievement of all other 
SDGs, policy makers must choose and implement policies that will make access to electricity 
possible for all at a tariff that is as low as possible, yet reflective of the true costs of providing 
electricity to ensure the sustainability of the ESI by being able generate enough revenues to 
cover operational costs, create reserves for future investment and provide returns that enable 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical framework for this study, which forms the basis for the 
estimated model. It specifies the statistical model used in the study, elaborates on the estimation 
technique and reasons for the variables chosen. The chapter also covers the explanation of the 
data source, period and sample size.  
 
3.2  Data source and period 
This panel data study was for a period of 23 years from 1990, when the ESI reforms were 
initiated, to 2013. The multi-dimensional data tracked in this panel data, was (1) the growth in 
electricity generation, (2) electricity tariff, and (3) access rate to electricity by population, for 
all 48 Sub-Saharan African countries. The decision to limit the study up to 2013 was due to 
data availability in electricity generation classification. The data pertaining to the breakdown 
of electricity generation growth between governments and IPPs was available only up to 2013.  
 
The data used for the quantitative analysis was sourced from the World Bank databases and its 
related institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). Other data was collated from publications of reports that  used data 
from these institutions. These institutions are credible and command worldwide recognition in 
world statistical information. 
 
Some challenges of secondary data collection, as identified by Hawkins (1990), are that there 
might be a need for surrogate data due to unavailability or the relevant data may be available 
but not for the required periods. During the data collection process, some information for 
smaller countries in SSA was not available in the World Bank Databases. In such cases, 
alternative reliable sources were used, and the data is identified as such in this dissertation. 
Tustin (2005) argued that one trademark of a good researcher is the skilful application of less 
than ideal data in the course of his work. The statistical model used in this study was selected 






To counter the limitation of data availability, data triangulation became very critical. Erlandson 
et al. (1993) proposed that researchers seek out several different types of sources that can 
provide insights about the same events or relationship. 
  
3.3  Analytical framework 
The basic panel data equation which serves as the foundation for the analytical framework 
applied in this study is expressed as: 
 
𝑦$% = 𝑥$%𝛽 + 𝛼$ + 𝑢$% for t = 1, …,T and i = 1…, N 
where: 
𝑦$% is the dependent variable for individual i at time t  
𝑥$% is the time variant 1 x K (the number of independent variables) regressor vector 
𝛽 is the K x 1 matrix of parameters 
𝛼$ is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect. 
 
3.4  Model specification and empirical framework 
This study applied a model that describes the relationship between the tested variables, namely 
electricity generation capacity, tariff increase and access to electricity in relation to the 
implementation of IPPs in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
The effect of IPPs on electricity generation capacity was modelled using the static panel data 
model in equation 1 
𝑛$,% = 𝛽' + 𝛽!𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠$,% + 𝛽"𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐$,% + 𝛽"𝑝𝑜𝑝$,% + 𝛽"𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒$,% + 𝜀$,%              1 
here 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote country and year respectively, 𝑔𝑒𝑛 refers to electricity generation, 𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠 
refers to the IPP status of a country, 1 if a country uses IPP and 0 zero otherwise; 𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐 is GDP 
per capita; 𝑝𝑜𝑝 is country’s population, and 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 refers to private participation in electricity 
generation.  
 
Equation 2 presents the panel data modelling the effect of IPPs on electricity tariffs across the 
sample countries 
𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑓$,% = 𝛽' + 𝛽!𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠$,% + 𝛽"𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐$,% + 𝛽"𝑝𝑜𝑝$,% ++𝛽"𝑒𝑐𝑝𝑐$,% + 𝛽"𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛$,% + 𝜀$,%             2 
where 𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑓 denotes electricity tariff measured as US cents, 𝑒𝑐𝑝𝑐 is electricity consumption per 





Finally, the IPP and electricity access relationship is presented in equation 3;  
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠$,% = 𝛽' + 𝛽!𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠$,% + 𝛽"𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐$,% + 𝛽"𝑝𝑜𝑝$,% ++𝛽"𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑝$,% + 𝛽"𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛$,%           3 
where 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 is electricity access measured as the electricity consumption per capita, 𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑝 is 
rural population growth; other variables are as defined before.  
 
3.5  Variable description and expected signs 
The subjects of this study are the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and according to the 
literature reviewed by the researcher, 29 of these 48 countries still maintain a utility monopoly 
structure while 19 have IPPs. The results of the IPP countries were compared with those of the 
29 countries with monopoly structures. The variable that was then tested for these sample 
countries was the impact of IPPs on electricity generation, tariff increase and access to 
generation by the population. 
 
3.5.1  Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study was chosen based on the study hypotheses to be tested to 
achieve the objectives of the study.  
 
3.5.2  Electricity generation capacity 
This variable was measured on the installed capacity of the country and growth thereof, tracked 
from when IPPs were introduced or not. The installed capacity has been expressed in MW and 
addition as a percentage indication of the actual MW. 
 
3.5.3  Electricity tariff  
The electricity tariffs were measured in US cents and because for domestic customers the 
commercial and industrial tariffs are different, the average tariff and any changes were 
measured in percentages. 
 
3.5.4  Access to electricity 
The access rate to electricity was measured in a form of a percentage of the people with access 






3.5.5 Independent variables 
The independent variables included in the study were premised on the literature review that 
suggested that countries that adopt a policy of IPPs (1) tend to have higher growth in electricity 
generation capacity, (2) electricity tariffs become cheaper, and (3) because of the high 
generation capacity and cheater tariffs, this results in the population of that country having 
higher access to electricity. The policy choice of a country whether it has implemented IPP or 
a non-IPP country was the dependent variable. This was because for the purpose of this study 
was to assess the impact of a country that has IPPs versus that without IPPs on the independent 
variable, and more importantly, the three independent variables that were a focus of this study. 
The expression of this dependent variable in the model equation was denoted by 1 if a country 
has IPPs and 0 (zero) if otherwise.  
 
3.6  Estimation approach 
3.6.1  Fixed effects and random effects model 
Kreft and De Leeuw (1998) defined ‘fixed effects’ as constants across individual entities 
having different intercepts for each entity with a constant slope for all entities, while 
random effects vary, and the model’s intercept is a random outcome variable. For example, 
in a growth study, a model with random intercepts ai and fixed slope b corresponds to 
parallel lines for different individuals i, or the model yit=ai+bt. thus distinguishing 
between fixed and random coefficients. 
 
There is much debate about the difference between fixed and random effects models 
because of the ‘conditional’ versus ‘unconditional issue. The choice to use a fixed or 
random effects model, to a great extent, was influenced by the homogeneity of the effect-
size parameters. If all of the studies estimate a common effect-size parameter, then ‘fixed 
effect’ analysis is appropriate. However, if there is heterogeneity among the population 
effects estimated, then the ‘random effect’ procedure is the most appropriate. 
 
The most important consideration in selecting the appropriate model to use, that is choosing 
between a ‘fixed’ and ‘random’ effects model, is the nature of the inference desired. Where 
the desired inference is  related to the effect-size parameters in the study observed, then this 
means a ‘conditional inference’ is desired and as such the ‘fixed effect model’ is the most 




study is to be made, the ‘random effect’ model is appropriate to be used to draw an 
unconditional inference. For the purposes of this study, due to the conditional nature of the 






CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1  Introduction 
This section details the findings of the research with regards to (1) generation growth, (2) tariff, 
and (3) electricity access, comparing the performance of countries with IPPs against those 
countries without IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa. The three variables observed in this research are 
individually discussed and observed phenomenon described. A statistical model is presented 
which was applied to test the relationship between these variables and whether the policy 
choice of a country has an impact on how these variables move.  
 
4.2  Generation growth analysis 
Sub-Saharan Africa had a total installed electricity generation capacity of 54 916 MW in the 
beginning of 1990. The average installed capacity per country can be said was at 1 168MW; 
however, this is not a true reflection, as only six countries had installed capacity greater than 
1000 MW then and the other countries had installed capacity below 1000 MW. South Africa 
accounted for 59 percent of the total installed capacity of the entire Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In 2013, the reported installed capacity was 92 651MW, indicating a total addition of 37 735 
MW. This represented an increase of 69 percent in installed capacity between 1990 and 2013. 
The average installed capacity per country improved from 1 168 MW in 1990 to 1 971MW in 
2013. However, again only 15 countries had installed capacity with more than 1000 MW while 
the rest had installed capacity below 1000 MW. South Africa’s capacity and growth distorts 
the average for the region: some instances of the analysis looked at the comparative analysis, 
with and without South Africa. 
 
The generation capacity added between 1990 and 2013 could further be broken down to 
distinguish the capacity added by IPPs and Non-IPP.  IPPs account for 31 percent or 11 608 
MW of installed capacity added during the period under review, whereas non-IPP accounted 










Figure 4.1: Added electrical generation capacity 1990 to 2013 
Although the IPP projects were many, they added smaller quantum of power, whereas the non-
IPPs undertook fewer larger projects. The researcher could not establish the associated costs of 
closing each project to compare the economic efficiency of concluding a project between the 
IPPs and non-IPPs. In terms of greater impact, the non-IPPs not only added more capacity, but 
each project had a higher contribution to generation capacity, bringing the economies of scale. 
 
What has been presented thus far, is the total installed electricity generation growth that the 
study assessed and analysed in terms of how much capacity was added by IPPs and non-IPP. 
However, this information had not as yet revealed which of the countries added more capacity 
based on policy choice of having IPPs in the ESI or not. It should be borne in mind that the 
countries which have embraced IPPs still maintain state-owned utilities that continue to exist 
parallel to IPPs. Therefore, in those countries the installed capacity growth is a contribution by 
both IPPs and state-owned utilities. 
 
For the period under review, countries without IPPs added 5 371MW or 14 percent while the 
countries with IPP added 32 364 MW or 86 percent. This suggests that the countries with IPPs 
added more capacity. In the countries with IPPs, government utilities still dominated by 
contributing more than IPPs. Of the 32 364 MW added in those countries, IPPs contributed 36 






Figure 4.2: Installed electricity generation (MW) 2013 
 
Source: Researcher’s estimate from research data 
 
 
The coexistence of IPPs and government utilities may be proving to be a model which can 
assist in propelling the increase in electricity generation growth, where the utilities lead the 
development and IPPs augment government’s efforts. An alternative argument could be that 
the IPPs are nevertheless targeting countries where the conditions are already favourable in 
terms of market conditions and financial standing of those countries. This could be evidenced 
by the concentration of IPP projects in  countries that have a certain economic profile. As can 
be seen in Figure 4.2, the countries with IPPs already reflect a higher level of installed capacity. 
Correlation with economic growth, credit rating and other factors were not tested in this study; 
however, these elements also explain some of the observable phenomena. 
 
The graph in Figure 4.3 delineates the added generation capacity according to the countries and 
demarcated according to policy choice from 1990 to 2013. Again, the countries with IPPs 
added more installed generation compared to the non-IPP countries. 
 
The juxtaposition of Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 confirms that IPP countries have higher installed 
capacity and also account for higher growth in the installed generation capacity. Although 





a particular ESI market  adds momentum to the growth of generated electricity more than what 




Figure 4.3: Added generation capacity 1990 – 2013 
Source: Researcher’s estimate from research data 
 
The juxtaposition of Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 confirms that IPP countries have higher installed 
capacity and also account for higher growth in the installed generation capacity. Although 
utilities lead by adding more capacity than IPPs, it can be argued that the existence of IPPs in 
a particular ESI market adds momentum to the growth of generated electricity more than what 
utilities would achieve alone.   
 
Although this study’s main focus was on the impact of IPPs, the results as indicated in this 
section highlight the role and contribution of state-owned utilities as still significant. As such, 
the importance of the role played by state-owned utilities must be accentuated especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Contemporary policy and literature focus are more on introducing private 
participation in the ESI and less focus is on the models to make state-owned utilities more 
efficient and progressive.  
 
In SSA, almost 29 countries depend exclusively on state-owned utilities to pioneer solutions 
for those countries to close the energy access gap. The introduction of IPPs in these markets 
may not necessarily be the solution as most of these ESI markets are small. Drawing from the 





implementation of liberalisation of their ESI due to their market sizes, the solution of some of 
the smaller countries is dependent on the state-owned utilities.  
 
4.3  Tariff analysis 
The average electricity tariff in SSA is determined to be US$0.19 per KWh as depicted in 


















 Source: Researcher’s estimate from research data 
 
Figure 4.4: SSA electricity tariffs ((US$c per KWh) 
      Source: Researcher’s estimate from research data 
 
The figure above further suggests that there are more non-IPP countries whose tariff are above 
the total average of US$0.19 per KWh with 48 percent of non-IPP countries having tariffs 
above the average while only 32 percent for IPP countries have that. This information is 
particularly important in that there is a belief that where private participation in the form of 
IPPs is present, the tariffs get to be higher than those ESI markets that are dominated by state-
owned utilities. Contrary to that, state-owned utilities keep electricity tariffs artificially low to 
try and stimulate economic activity and growth and also to make it accessible to the poor.  
 
The results as analysed in Figure 4.4 suggest that countries in SSA that still have only state-
owned utilities are more likely to have higher electricity tariffs. A question that must then be 
asked, is if tariffs are generally higher in the IPP countries, should this then be a favourable 






To properly understand this dynamic, reference must be made to Figure 4.2, as there seems to 
be a correlation between the tariff and installed capacity. The countries that have higher 
installed capacity have lower tariffs, while the countries that have smaller installed capacity 
have high tariffs. This can be explained by the market size, in that when looking at countries 
such as Somalia and Liberia, it is evident that they have small installation and fewer customers 
must then share the total cost of the ESI. In countries where there is larger installation and a 
higher access rate, the tariff is low because of economies of scale, and thus the more customers 
that are connected, the lower the tariff gets. 
 
This observation highlights the need to have more high-impact generation in SSA to increase 
the number of customers that are connected so that the unit price of electricity is low due to 
many customers sharing the costs associated with providing electricity. As it is common 
knowledge that SSA is plagued by poverty and inequality, the expectation that the majority 
who survive on less than US$1 a day, are able to afford electricity at an average tariff of 
US$0.19 per KWh is not based on the reality of progressing the ESI in this region. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the tariff methodology, structure and philosophy were not 
extensively evaluated.  It is important to highlight that most of the countries provide subsidised 
electricity up to a certain level, i.e. the first 15KWh is either provided free or highly subsidised 
to enable even the poorest of the poor to have basic access to electricity. While other countries 
connect customers to the grid for free, most countries also require customers to pay to be 
connected. In some countries the connection fee is minimal while in others very prohibitive. 
This highlights some of the  issues that impact the ESI other than the factors covered in this 
study. 
 
One of the  issues in ESI is setting the right tariff to strike a balance between the ESI business 
imperatives and societal needs. The ESI requires a certain level of tariff to be able to recover 
all its costs of providing electricity and be able to invest in future infrastructure needs, such as 
generation assets, transmission and distribution networks. Society, with the constraint of 
limited financial resources, requires the tariff to be as low as possible. Since a low tariff makes 
it difficult to attract funding and investment in the sector, this results in the inability to invest 





These opposing and conflicting objectives often result in mistrust and even conflict between 
these players. To mitigate this problem, most countries have independent regulators charged 
with the responsibility to consider all the factors affecting all players or interested parties and 
after taking these into consideration, set a transparent, fair and equitable tariff. 
 
Most countries are increasing their tariffs to achieve a tariff that is “cost reflective”. However, 
this makes electricity expensive for the poor but to make the tariff  as cheap as possible, there 
needs to be customers connected to the grid so that they may share the associated costs.  
 
The prevalent challenge related to tariff setting in SSA is for governments to have a systematic 
approach choosing to first connect as many customers and once they are connected, gradually 
move towards a cost reflective tariff. Such an approach would have a dual benefit in that (1) 
the access rate gap would be closed and the quality of life for those who are connected will 
improve, and (2) a clear commitment to achieve a cost reflective tariff after maximising 
connection would still provide a blueprint for sustainability which will be attractive to 
investors. 
 
The ideology of keeping tariffs artificially low, meaning the tariff set at a low level that does 
not allow the recovery of operating and capital costs, does not benefit any of the ESI players.  
It makes customers to be used to an artificial tariff but later exposing them to very steep 
increases where expansions must be funded and to avoid the collapse of the ESI. 
 
Similarly, an exorbitantly high tariff has an impact of driving customers to investigate  
alternative sources of energy outside the grid. This results in intensive electricity users finding 
their own energy sources and resulting in low volume uptake from the main grid and some 
other industrial customers looking at investing in other countries, regions or even continents to 
avoid high electricity costs, which is a basic input in many production processes forming a 
substantial part of a company’s operating costs. 
Whether an artificially low tariff encourages economic growth and growth in access to 
electricity, is still out on jury as there is no evidence of higher economic activity or return for 
those countries that have kept their tariff low. Sudan, Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
and many other countries had the lowest tariffs in SSA as indicated in Figure 4.4. However, 






4.4  Electricity access as  percentage of the population 
The most important indicator of whether an ESI in a country is doing well, is the access by the 
general population to electricity. In SSA, the customer profile reflects that at least 60 percent 













Figure 4.5: Percentage of population with access to electricity (1990 vs 2013) 
 
In 1990, the now IPP countries had an average electricity access rate of 25 percent and this 
improved to 48 percent in 2013. These figures are both above the average for the total of the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region in 1990 and in 2013. The non-IPP countries reported an average of 
13 percent in 1990 and 35 percent for 2013, below the total average of 19 percent and 41 
percent for 1990 and 2013, respectively. 
 
The average percentage change of all the SSA countries in the access rate between 1990 and 
2013 is 22 percent. Countries without IPPs and those with IPPs indicate an average change of 
20.3 percent and 23.15 percent, respectively. Again, this indicates that the countries with IPPs 
register a slightly higher percentage change in the access rate above the total average. 
 
Figure 4.5 further indicates that 58 percent of countries with IPP have an access rate average 
total of 41 percent, whereas, only 34.5 percent of countries without IPPs tallied an access rate 




the period under review, which means that when comparing the installed capacity between 
1990 and 2013, there was a reduction in the countries’ installed capacity. 
 
4.5  Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1below presents the descriptive statistics results for the variables electricity generation 
(EGEN), electricity tariff (ETARIFF), electricity access (EACCESS), IPP status, GDP per 
capita (GDPPC), population (POP), electricity consumption per capita (ENCONPC) and 
electricity dependency per capita (ENDEPPC). The results in Table 4.1 reveal that means for 
all the variables are greater than their corresponding medians, implying that the distributions 
of all the variables considered in this study are right-skewed. That is, all the variables in Table 
4.1 are positively distributed. The difference between the maximum value (Max) and minimum 
value (Min) gives the range. The range and standard deviation (Std. Dev.) are measures of 
absolute variability. Larger values of the standard deviation and range indicate a lot of 
variability or volatility between the minimum value and the maximum value. The values of 
both the range and standard deviation for all the variables in Table 4.1 are relatively large 
indicating a lot of variability or volatility in the data sets for the variables considered in this 
study.   
 
Table 4.2 presents the IPP status of the countries in the sample data. The results reveal that 
about 60 percent of the countries in the sample are Non-IPP (that is, they do not have 
independent power producers) while about 40 percent of the countries in the study are IPP (that 
is, they have independent power producers).  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
Notes: EGEN=Electricity Generation; ETARIFF=Electricity Tariff; EACCESS=Electricity Access; IPP=IPP Status; 
GDPPC=GDP Per capita; POP=Population; ENCONPC=Electricity Consumption per capita; ENDEPPC=Electricity 
dependency per capita 
 
Stats Mean Median Std Dev. Min Max N 
EGEN 1464.447 189 5672.982 4 47643 1200 
ETARRIFF 0.112 0.100 0.091 -0.160 0.600 1200 
EACCESS 29.299 22.215 25.497 0.010 99.440 1200 
IPP_STATUS 0.397 0.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 1200 
GDPPC 1498.186 576.630 2556.935 102.640 22742.380 1151 
POP 1.51E+07 8216896 2.32E+07 69507 1.76E+08 1197 
ENCONPC 546.717 150.705 930.4558 21.63 4777.06 584 




Table 4.2 presents the correlation analysis results of the variables. The results show that there 
is a highly significant positive correlation (p < 0.01) between electricity generation (EGEN) 
and electricity access, electricity tariff, IPP status, GDP per capita, population, electricity 
consumption per capita, and electricity dependency per capita. The results further reveal that 
there is a highly significant strong positive correlation between electricity generation and 
population (r =0.707), electricity access and GDP per capita (r = 0.792), GDP per capita and 
electricity consumption per capita (r = 0.645), and electricity consumption per capita and 
electricity dependency per capita (r = 0.848).  
 
Based on equation 2, there is a significant weak positive correlation between electricity tariff 
and IPP status, population and GDP per capita. There is no significant correlation between 
electricity tariff and electricity consumption per capita, and electricity dependency per capita. 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation analysis 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.EGEN 1.000        
2.EACCESS 0.188*** 1.000       
3.ETARIFF 0.199*** 0.200*** 1.000      
4.IPP_STATUS 0.388*** 0.174*** 0.147*** 1.000     
5.GDPCC 0.161*** 0.792*** 0.238*** 0.027 1.000    
6.POP 0.707*** 0.386*** 0.190*** 0.365*** 0.411*** 1.000   
7.ENCONPC 0.487*** 0.553*** 0.014 0.080** 0.597*** 0.117*** 1.000  
8.ENDEPPC 0.395*** 0.597*** 0.024 0.007 0.645*** 0.119*** 0.848*** 1.000 
Notes: EGEN=Electricity Generation; ETARIFF=Electricity Tariff; EACCESS=Electricity Access; IPP=IPP Status; 
GDPPC=GDP Per capita; POP=Population; ENCONPC=Electricity Consumption per capita; ENDEPPC=Electricity 
dependency per capita; ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
4.6  Regression results 
The regression results of the effect of IPPs on electricity generation are presented in Table 4.3 
(Equation 1). The equation was estimated using the random effects (REM), generalised least 
squares (GLS) and the panel-corrected ordinary least square (OLS-PCSE) estimation 
techniques. The coefficient of determination (R-squared) shows that approximately 55.5 
percent and 79.13 percent variations of electricity generation are explained by the models for 
the REM and OLS-PCSE techniques respectively. The results also reveal that based on REM, 
GSL and OLS-PCSE approaches, there is a significant (p<0.001) multiple linear relationship 
between electricity generation and the explanatory variables (IPP Status, GDP per capita and 




regression models were estimated by considering the error structure, which was found to be 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated.  
 
The coefficient of IPP status is observed to be positive across all the techniques, but only 
significant in the GSL and OLS-PCSE models at one percent, which indicates that countries 
with IPPs generate higher electricity compared to non-IPP countries. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Traore (2013) . 
  
The coefficients GDP per capita and population are both positive and significant at one percent 
across all three estimation techniques. This indicates that higher income levels and population 
are associated with higher electricity generation. This is consistent with the findings of 
Poloamina and Umoh (2013) 
Results from Table 4.4 reveal that based on REM and GLM approaches, there is a significant 
(p<0.001) multiple linear relationship between electricity tariffs and the explanatory (or 
independent) variables IPP Status, GDP per capita, population and electricity consumption per 
capita. The R-squared value (which is the coefficient of determination) is 51.3 percent based 
on the REM approach. This suggests that just over 51 percent of the variation in electricity 
tariffs is accounted for by a combination of the explanatory variables IPP Status, GDP per 
capita, population and electricity consumption per capita. This suggest a moderate good fit 
model for electricity tariffs based on REM and GLM. However, in this case the OLS approach 
suggests the poor fit with an r-squared value of just less than 20 percent. The multiple linear 
regression model based on all the three approaches suggests that IPP Status contributes 
negatively to electricity tariffs which is in support of the hypothesised claim. Overall, the 





Table 4.3: IPP and electricity generation 
Electricity generation REM GLS OLS-PCSE 

























R-squared 0.555   0.7913 
Wald 𝜒" (4) 152.570 1682.430 949.73 
Prob > 𝜒" 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Hettest 𝜒" 7.33     
Prob > 𝜒" 0.0068     
AR (1) 295.898     
Prob > F 0.000     
Countries  48 48 48 
Observations  1,150 1,150 1,150 
Notes: IPP=IPP Status; GDPPC=GDP Per capita; POP=Population; Hettest= test for heteroskedasticity; AR(1)=Test for 
first order autocorrelation. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the relationship between IPP status and electricity access. The 
results reveal that based on all the three approaches, REM, GLM and OLS, there is a significant 
(p<0.001) multiple linear relationship between electricity access and the explanatory (or 
independent) variables IPP Status, GDP per capita, population and electricity dependency per 
capita. However, the R-squared value (which is the coefficient of determination) of less than 
40 percent based on all the three approaches suggests a poor fit. This suggests that less than 40 
percent of the variation in electricity access is accounted for (or explained) by a combination 
of the explanatory (or independent or predictor) variables IPP Status, GDP per capita, 






Table 4.4: IPP and electricity tariffs 
Notes: EGEN=Electricity Generation; ETARIFF=Electricity Tariff; EACCESS=Electricity Access; IPP=IPP Status; 
GDPPC=GDP Per capita; POP=Population; ENCONPC=Electricity Consumption per capita; Hettesr= test for 




The coefficient of IPP status is observed to be positive and significant across all estimation 
techniques which suggests that countries with IPP have higher access to electricity, as proposed 
by Traore (2013). In addition, the results suggest GDP per capita has a highly significant effect 
on electricity access while population and energy dependency have a negative effect on 
electricity access.  
  
Electricity tariffs REM GLS OLS-PCSE 































R-squared 0.513  0.1965 
Wald 𝜒" (4) 1978. 81.69 518.04 
Prob > 𝜒" 0.000 0.0000 0.000 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Hettest 𝜒" 55.670   
prob > 𝜒" 0.000   
AR (1) 20.308   
Prob > F 0.0002   
Countries  24 24 24 




Table 4.5: IPP and electricity access 
Electricity access REM GLS OLS-PCSE 































R-squared 0.2043  0.396 
Wald 𝜒"(5) 1295.74 297.29 1128.82 
Prob > 𝜒" 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Hettest 𝜒" 2.38   
prob > 𝜒" 0.1225   
AR (1) 6.925   
Prob > F 0.0131   
Countries  32 32 32 
Observations  616 616 616 
Notes: EGEN=Electricity Generation; ETARIFF=Electricity Tariff; EACCESS=Electricity Access; IPP=IPP Status; 
GDPPC=GDP Per capita; POP=Population; ENDEPPC=Electricity dependency per capita; Hettesr= test for 








CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
5.1  Introduction 
This section provides the conclusion of the study based on the descriptive statistics analysis 
and statistical model results. Policy recommendations are also made for consideration by the 
users of this research report. Avenues for future research that will add greater insight in this 
subject and positively contribute to the development of the ESI in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
highlighted herein. 
 
5.2  Summary and conclusion of the study 
The results of the study provide empirical evidence that countries with IPPs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa tend to have (1) higher electricity generation growth, (2) lower tariffs on average, and 
(3) higher population access to electricity on average compared to  countries without IPPs. The 
results of the panel data estimations on 48 African countries over a 23-year period established 
a significant relationship between the IPP status of a country and electricity generation, tariff 
and access rate. The main conclusions drawn from the study include the following: 
• The use of IPPs improves the electricity generation capacity of Sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
• The use of IPPs reduces electricity tariff in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
• The use of IPPs improves electricity access in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
5.3  Policy recommendation 
Developing adequate ESI policy for the Sub-Saharan African region will forever be a complex 
endeavour because of  issues that impact this industry. However, solutions must be found that 
will accelerate the development of the ESI in SSA as the achievement of most of the SDGs and 
Agenda 2063 are intrinsically linked to access to reliable electricity. There can never be a one-
size fits all solution for this region as the challenges are not the same. 
 
Based on this study, there are considerable benefits in opening up the ESI to include 
Independent Power Producers as this has proven to increase generation capacity, reduce tariffs 




decision alone to open up to IPPs is never sufficient, there are other factors that support the 
achievement of the desired end state. 
 
The study compared the performance of countries where IPPs were present and those that did 
not have IPPs. It must further be highlighted that the countries that had IPPs still also had state-
owned utility companies that coexisted with the IPPs. Policy should also consider the 
contribution of these institutions and seek to strengthen them to continue to close the gap which 
IPPs cannot  fulfil. 
 
5.4  Avenue for future research 
Future research should focus on “ideal conditional factors” that a country should have to attract 
investment in electricity infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa whether the ESI structure permits  
IPPs or not. An untested observation is that the IPPs would invest in countries with certain 
economic fundamentals in place, such as credit rating, quality of government guarantees and 
political and economic stability. 
 
The argument can then be made that the IPPs did not bring any new form of funding that the 
government would not access through the strength of its balance sheet or on the merit of its 
economic performance. It is for this reason that countries that are not doing well in electricity 
generation growth, tariff and access, would not attract IPP investment even if their ESI 
structure allowed IPP investments.  
 
Considering the continued importance of the state-owned utilities, further research on state-
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